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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Imagine you are a police officer working for your local police department.  One night 
while you are on patrol with your partner, you stop at the local doughnut shop.  There, you 
witness your partner not only engage in conversation with a well known drug dealer in the area 
named Smokey, but also accept an unmarked envelope from him.  When your partner returns, he 
hands you the envelope and asks if you can keep it in your locker for a few days.  Despite the 
suspicious circumstances, you agree and store the envelope.   
A few days later, you begin to hear rumors that a few of your fellow officers have been 
taking bribes from local drug dealers in return for allowing those dealers to pass freely through 
the city.  In response to these allegations, your department opens an investigation and 
interrogates officers one at a time.  When it is your turn to be interrogated, you fear that you will 
be disciplined because you are still holding the envelope for your partner.  Upon entering the 
interrogation room, the only statement your employer makes is that you must talk or be fired.  
Unaware that this situation grants you automatic immunity from your self-incriminating 
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statements, you fear criminal prosecution and instinctively tell your employer that you are going 
to exercise your right to remain silent.  You are fired on the spot. 
Although the Supreme Court has held that public employees must be granted immunity 
from self-incriminating statements when presented with a choice between answering the 
employer’s questions or facing disciplinary action, the Court has failed to clarify whether the 
employer must also give the employees notice of their Fifth Amendment rights and immunities 
prior to asking them potentially incriminating questions.  On this issue, the federal circuits are 
split.  The Fifth1, Eighth2, and Eleventh3 Circuits adopt the “no affirmative tender” approach, 
holding that the government is under no affirmative duty to disclose to employees their rights 
and immunities prior to questioning.  Conversely, the Second4, Seventh5, and Federal6 Circuits 
adopt the “duty to advise” approach, holding that a government employer is under a duty to 
advise its employees of their rights and immunities under the Fifth Amendment prior to asking 
them potentially incriminating questions.  
This article argues that the courts should adopt the “duty to advise” approach to a public 
employer’s disclosure obligations.  Part II describes the historical evolution of the Supreme 
Court’s decisions regarding the rights and immunities of public employees under the Fifth 
Amendment.  Part III presents the circuit split on the issue of whether the government must give 
                                                 
1 Gulden v. McCorkle, 680 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1982).   
2 Hill v. Johnson, 160 F.3d 469 (8th Cir. 1988).   
3 Hester v. Milledgeville, 777 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1985).   
4 Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass’n v. Commissioner of Sanitation of the City of New York, 426 F.2d 619 (2nd Cir. 
1970).   
5 Atwell v. Lisle Park District, 286 F.3d 987 (7th Cir. 2002).   
6 Modrowski v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 252 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001).    
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employees notice of their rights and immunities under the Fifth Amendment prior to asking them 
potentially incriminating questions.  Part IV analyzes the arguments on both sides of the issue 
and argues that the “duty to advise” approach is preferable for four reasons. First, it eliminates 
the potential for public employees to attempt to exercise their constitutional privilege against 
self-incrimination and unknowingly subject themselves to discipline.  Second, it eliminates the 
potential that the government will use its position of power to manipulate or exploit the 
employee.  Third, the burden imposed on the government in comparison to the protection 
afforded to the employees would be inherently low.  Fourth, it facilitates the government in the 
process of fact-finding by giving the employees an incentive for honesty.   
Part V concludes. 
II. BACKGROUND: PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND IMMUNITIES 
A. Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination 
 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution states in pertinent part that “No 
person…shall be compelled to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law.”7  The broad scope of the Fifth Amendment affords United 
States citizens two important rights.8  First, it protects individuals from being involuntarily called 
as witnesses against themselves in a criminal prosecution.9  Second, it gives them the privilege 
not to answer “official questions” put to them in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal 
or informal, where the answers might be self-incriminating in future criminal proceedings.10  
Basically, the Fifth Amendment affords United States citizens protection from being compelled 
                                                 
7 U.S.C. Const. amend. V.  
8 McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924). 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
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to make self-incriminating statements unless first granted immunity from further prosecution.11  
Thus, any potentially self-incriminating statement may be used against a citizen only if it is made 
voluntarily, or without the improper pressures of coercion.   
In the 1966 case Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court reinforced this concept and held 
that “the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming 
from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural 
safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.”12  More specifically, any 
persons that are subject to custodial interrogation must first be given a Miranda Warning, which 
includes being advised that they have a right to remain silent, that their statements can be used 
against them in evidence, and that they have a right to an attorney.13  The Court further held that 
these rights may be waived only if the waiver is made “voluntarily, knowingly, and 
intelligently.”14  As such, prior to custodial interrogation law enforcement officers must first give 
a Miranda Warning so as to ensure that citizens are informed of their rights and immunities 
under the Fifth Amendment. 
B. Basic Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in the Public Employment Context under Garrity 
and Spavek 
 
Although the Supreme Court clarified the scope of the Fifth Amendment in the typical 
criminal law context by in Miranda, the extent of the Fifth Amendment rights and immunities of 
public employees when asked potentially incriminating questions remained unclear.  However, 
                                                 
11 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). 
12 384 U.S. 436, 444. 
13 Id. 
14 Id.   
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in 1967, the Supreme Court passed down two opinions on the issue of whether the government 
can use the threat of discharge to secure incriminatory evidence against an employee.  
The Supreme Court first addressed this issue in Garrity v. New Jersey.15  There, the police 
department coerced officers into answering self-incriminating questions by threatening to fire 
them for refusal to answer.16   Consequently, the officers answered the questions, and some of 
the answers were used in subsequent prosecutions against them.17 As such, the officers were 
presented with the choice between self-incrimination and losing their jobs.   
The Court held that the choice presented to the employees amounted to coercion because 
“the option to lose their means of livelihood or pay the penalty of self-incrimination is the 
antithesis of free choice to speak out or to remain silent.”18  Like the circumstances in Miranda, 
the practice of offering the option of losing one’s job or making self-incriminating statements is 
“likely to exert such pressure upon an individual as to disable him from making a free and 
rational choice.”19  Thus, the Garrity decision protects public employees from self-incrimination 
by prohibiting the use of statements obtained under threat of removal from employment in 
subsequent criminal proceedings.20   
On the same day that the Supreme Court decided Garrity, it also decided Spaveck v. Klein, 
in which Justice Fortas’s concurring opinion noted that the Garrity decision did not stand for the 
proposition that public employees were immune from being discharged for refusal to testify on 
                                                 
15 385 U.S. 493, 495 (1967).   
16 Id.  
17 Id.   
18 Id. at 497.   
19 Id.   
20 Id. at 500. 
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conduct relative to their employment.21  Instead, he stated, the decision in Garrity only rendered 
the dismissal of a public employee for refusal to testify improper when the government sought to 
use the testimony in subsequent criminal proceedings.22 Thus, where public employees are 
forced to answer potentially incriminating questions under threat of being fired, such statements 
cannot be used against them in subsequent criminal proceedings.  
C. Gardner: The Ban on Requiring Waiver of Immunity 
Just over a year later in 1968, the Supreme Court decided Gardner v. Broderick,23 which 
confronted the issue of whether public employees may be fired for refusing to waive their Fifth 
Amendment Privilege against self-incrimination.  The Court reviewed the Garrity and Spaveck 
decisions and held that if public employees refuse to answer questions “specifically, directly, and 
narrowly” relating to the performance of their official duties, without being required to waive 
their immunity in subsequent criminal proceedings, then the privilege against self-incrimination 
would not bar dismissal from employment.24  However, where public employees are discharged 
from office not for failure to answer relevant questions about their duties as employees, but 
rather for refusing to waive a constitutional right, such discharge is improper because it violates 
the rights and immunities afforded to citizens under the Fifth Amendment.25  Therefore, the 
practice of presenting public employees with a choice between job loss and self-incrimination is 
unconstitutional, regardless of its effectiveness.26   
                                                 
21 385 U.S. 511, 519 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring). 
22 Id.   
23 392 U.S. 273. 
24 Id. at 278.   
25 Id.   
26 Id.   
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D. Lekowitz I & II: The Limited Expansion of Public Employee Rights and Immunities 
Finally, the last two Supreme Court cases related to public employee Fifth Amendment 
rights and immunities were decided in the 1970s.  The first case, Lefkowitz v. Turley (Lefkowitz 
I), addressed the issue of whether public contractors are afforded the same rights and immunities 
as public employees when presented with the choice between waiving their Fifth Amendment 
rights against self-incrimination and losing their contracts with the government.27  The Court 
held such a practice is indeed unconstitutional, and reasoned that there was no difference 
between the threat of job loss to a public employee and threat of loss of contracts to a contractor 
who is engaged in business with the government.28  Essentially, the Court found that such a 
threat amounts to coercion because the choice presented to the contractors threatened their 
livelihood.29  As a result, any incriminating statements elicited as a result of that coercion could 
not be used against the contractors in any subsequent criminal proceeding, regardless of any 
governmental need for such statements.30   
The Supreme Court further expanded the concept of public employee immunity in 
Lefkowitz v. Cunningham (Lefkowitz II) when it addressed the issue of whether public employers 
may sanction or discipline public employees for refusing to waive their constitutional privilege 
against self-incrimination as long as the sanctions do not have economic ramifications.31  The 
Court in Lefkowitz II specifically addressed whether a political party officer could be sanctioned 
and prevented from holding further office for refusing to waive the Fifth Amendment protection 
                                                 
27 414 U.S. 70, 82 (1973).    
28 Id. at 83.   
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 431 U.S. 801, 802 (1977). 
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against self-incrimination.32  The Court held that where public employees are sanctioned or 
disciplined for refusing to waive their privilege against compelled self-incrimination without 
being tendered immunity from those statements, such practices amount to coercion and a 
violation of the Fifth Amendment.33  Therefore, unless public employees are immunized from 
subsequent criminal prosecution, any statements procured through threats of discipline, sanction 
or loss of employment for failure to waive the right of self-incrimination amount to coercion and 
are unconstitutional.  
III. THE NOTICE PROBLEM 
Although the Supreme Court made it clear that public employees cannot be constitutionally 
coerced to waive their privilege against self-incrimination without being granted immunity from 
subsequent criminal prosecution, the Court has been less clear as to whether a public employer 
has a duty to provide employees with notice of their rights and immunities.  To date, six federal 
circuit courts have addressed the issue of whether a public employer must give public employees 
notice of their rights and immunities prior to asking potentially incriminating questions.  The 
Fifth34, Eighth35, and Eleventh36 circuits have adopted the “no affirmative tender” approach and 
held that there is no notice requirement because the right to immunity attaches automatically 
when a public employee is compelled to waive their right to silence.37  This approach emphasizes 
that it is the threat of discipline or job loss that creates the constitutional protection of immunity 
                                                 
32 Id.   
33 Id. at 806. 
34 Gulden v. McCorkle, 680 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1982).   
35 Hill v. Johnson, 160 F.3d 469 (8th Cir. 1988).   
36 Hester v. Milledgeville, 777 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1985).   
37 Hill at 471-472. 
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and bars the answers from being used in subsequent proceedings, not the affirmative notice of 
immunity.38  Conversely, the Second39, Seventh40, and Federal41 circuits have adopted the “duty 
to advise” approach and held that prior to asking potentially incriminating questions, public 
employers must advise public employees that they may not refuse to answer the questions under 
the guise that the questions may be incriminating because they are entitled to immunity from 
subsequent prosecution.42  This approach emphasizes that the disclosure obligation is essential 
because it protects public employees who may not be well versed with the complex exceptions to 
the Garrity decision.43   
A. “No Affirmative Tender” Approach 
As stated above, the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh circuits adopt the “no affirmative tender” 
approach, which rejects a requirement for an affirmative tender of immunity to public employees 
prior to requiring them to answer potentially incriminating questions.  In the Fifth Circuit case 
Gulden v. McCorkle, the Dallas Public Works Department (the “Department”) sought to require 
its employees, including Charles Gulden and Richard Sage, to take a polygraph examination in 
connection with an investigation about a bomb threat.44  In the process of conducting the 
mandatory polygraph tests, the Department required employees to sign two waivers, one of 
                                                 
38 Gulden at 1075.  
39 Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass’n v. Commissioner of Sanitation of the City of New York, 426 F.2d 619 (2nd Cir. 
1970).   
40 Atwell v. Lisle Park District, 286 F.3d 987 (7th Cir. 2002).   
41 Modrowski v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 252 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001).    
42 Id. at 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001).    
43 Atwell at  990.   
44 680 F.2d 1070, 1071 (1982). 
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which stated that the employees were not being promised immunity in an effort to induce them to 
consent to the examination.45  However, upon being brought in for the examination, Gulden and 
Sage refused to either sign the waiver or submit to the polygraph, and as a result were fired.46   
As a result, Gulden and Sage sued in the District Court for the Northern District of Texas.47  
After a bench trial, the district court found for the Department and held that Gulden and Sage’s 
Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination were not violated because the polygraph 
examinations were purely job-related and the waiver sought only to obtain consent to take the 
polygraph.48  The court explained that the Fifth Amendment does not require an affirmative 
tender of immunity, but only requires that employees be advised that evidence obtained as a 
result of the polygraph may be used against them, and that they may not be dismissed for 
refusing to waive their right against self-incrimination.49 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court decision and held that public 
employers violate the Fifth Amendment rights of public employees only when the employees are 
both coerced to answer potentially incriminating questions and required to waive their right to 
immunity.50 As such, a public employer’s actions are unconstitutional if an employee’s discharge 
is predicated on his or her refusal to waive immunity.51  Moreover, there is no constitutional 
violation where an employee’s discharge is based on refusing to answer if there is no demand by 
                                                 
45 Id. at 1072.   
46 Id.   
47 Id. at 1073.   
48 Id.   
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 1074.   
51 Id.   
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the employer for the employee to relinquish the constitutional right to immunity.52  The court 
further held that there was no requirement for an affirmative tender of immunity because an 
explicit coercive demand by the employer that employees waive immunity or lose their job is 
what creates the constitutional problem, not the fact that the employee was never warned.53  
Thus, the Fifth Circuit rejected the notion that government employers should be required to give 
an affirmative tender of immunity to public employees when asking potentially incriminating 
questions because immunity attaches automatically as a result of the compulsion, not because the 
employees were notified of their rights.54  
Like the Fifth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit has also adopted the “no affirmative tender” 
approach, which supports automatic attachment of immunity to the public employee.  In Hill v. 
Johnson, J.D. Hill, a supervising officer at the Sheriff’s department, filed suit in the District 
Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas against the Sheriff of Pulaski County (the “Sheriff”) 
for violating his Fifth Amendment rights and immunities.55  After discovering that a photograph 
of a beaten detainee had gone missing, the Sheriff sought to question Hill about the incident and 
subject him to a polygraph examination.56  However, Hill refused to answer the questions and 
failed to appear for the polygraph examination.57  Subsequently, the Sheriff terminated Hill’s 
employment, which prompted Hill to file suit.58  Ultimately, the district court denied the 
                                                 
52 Id.   
53 Id.   
54 Id.   
55 160 F.3d 469, 470 (8th Cir. 1998).   
56 Id.   
57 Id. 
58 Id.   
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Sheriff’s motion for summary judgment, which alleged that no constitutional or statutory right 
was violated.59   
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment, 
holding that Hill failed to allege a “violation of clearly established Fifth Amendment rights of 
which a reasonable person would have known.”60  The court reasoned that because there is a 
substantial “public interest in securing from public employees an accounting of their public 
trust,” a government employer does not violate a public employee’s constitutional rights as long 
as the employer does not demand that the employee relinquish his constitutional immunity from 
prosecution.61  Thus, so long as the employer does not require the employee to waive immunity, 
it can compel the employee to either testify about the performance of official duties or forfeit 
employment.62   
The Eighth Circuit reinforced this holding and specifically rejected an employer’s duty to 
affirmatively offer immunity.  Citing Gulden, the court found that even if employees are not 
specifically informed that their answers could not be used against them in subsequent criminal 
prosecution, “the mere failure affirmatively to offer immunity is not an impermissible attempt to 
compel a waiver of immunity.”63  As such, regardless of whether public employees are given 
notice of their rights and immunities, a public employer’s actions are constitutional as long as the 
employees are not expressly asked to waive immunity rights on penalty of job loss, and any 
statements procured from them are not used against them in subsequent prosecution. 
                                                 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 471.   
61 Id.   
62 Id.   
63 Id.   
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Like the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, the Eleventh Circuit has also adopted the “no 
affirmative tender” approach.  In Hester v. Milledgeville, Freddie Hester brought an action in the 
District Court for the Middle District of Georgia against the City of Milledgeville (the City”), 
challenging the constitutionality of the City’s practice of requiring firefighters to submit to 
polygraph examinations.64  When the polygraph testing was implemented, the firefighters were 
required to sign one of four forms prior to taking the polygraph.65  In the first form, the employee 
consented to the use of the result in a subsequent judicial proceeding or administrative hearing.66  
In the second form, the employee waived all state and federal constitutional rights in connection 
with the polygraph.67  In the third form, the employee retained all constitutional rights and the 
permission to object to incriminating questions.68  In the fourth form, the employee refused to 
submit to the polygraph examination.69  Although Hester was never tested because the City 
agreed to postpone testing until the legality of the procedure was determined in court, he filed 
suit challenging the constitutionality of the requirement.70  The district court found for Hester, 
and issued a permanent injunction on the polygraph testing on the premise that the waiver system 
had the potential to violate rights of self-incrimination, due process, and privacy.71   
                                                 
64 777 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1985).   
65 Id.    
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id.   
70 Id.   
71 Id.   
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On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court and upheld the 
injunction against the polygraph testing.72  The court reasoned that because the City had no 
authority to require at least two of the waiver options, Hester and the other public employees 
would be in an inherently coercive situation.73  The court found that if it is unconstitutional for a 
public employer to compel a public employee to answer self-incriminating questions without 
immunity, it follows that if a public employee is compelled to give such self-incriminating 
evidence, that evidence could not be used in a subsequent criminal proceeding.74  As such, the 
court held that a notice requirement would serve “no useful purpose.75  Thus, no affirmative 
tender of immunity is necessary because the right to immunity after compelled testimony 
automatically attaches.76   
Therefore, the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have all developed a “no affirmative 
tender” approach, which refuses to require public employers to provide public employees with 
notice of their rights and immunities prior to being asked potentially incriminating questions.  
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that no notice is required because it is the coercive nature of the 
choice between compelled testimony and job forfeiture that automatically attaches the right to 
immunity under the Fifth Amendment.  The Eighth Circuit reasoned that no affirmative tender of 
immunity is required because there is no constitutional violation unless the public employees are 
expressly asked to waive their immunity rights or the information is actually used against them 
in subsequent prosecution.  Finally, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that there is no notice 
                                                 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 1495-1496.   
74 Id. at 1496.   
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
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requirement because it is implied in Garrity that if it is unconstitutional to compel self-
incrimination by a public employee without immunity, any testimony that is procured from 
compelled testimony could not be used in a subsequent criminal proceeding.  Thus, the Fifth, 
Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits found that the government has no duty to provide public 
employees with notice of their rights and immunities under the Fifth Amendment because 
immunity automatically attaches in coercive situations, causing the notice requirement to serve 
no legitimate purpose.  
B. The “Duty to Advise” Approach 
Alternatively, the Second77, Seventh78, and Federal79 Circuits have adopted the “duty to 
advise” approach.  Under this approach, a public employer has an affirmative duty to advise 
public employees about their Fifth Amendment rights and immunities prior to asking potentially 
incriminating questions.  In the Second Circuit Case Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass’n v. 
Commissioner of Sanitation of the City of New York, The City Department of Sanitation 
Employees (the “Employees”) sued the Commissioner of Sanitation of New York City (the 
“Commissioner”) in the District Court for the Southern District of New York seeking 
reinstatement from being fired after refusing to answer potentially incriminating questions.80  In 
1966, the City of New York required private waste carriers to purchase tickets for the privilege 
of using the City’s waste disposal facilities.81  As a result, the Department of Uniformed 
                                                 
77 Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass’n v. Commissioner of Sanitation of the City of New York, 426 F.2d 619 (2nd Cir. 
1970).   
78 Atwell v. Lisle Park District, 286 F.3d 987 (7th Cir. 2002 
79 Modrowski v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 252 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001).    
80 426 F.2d 619, 622 (2nd Cir. 1970).   
81 Id. at 621. 
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Sanitation was charged with the responsibility of selling those tickets.82  However, in the course 
of business, the Commissioner learned that some Employees were selling the tickets for cash and 
pocketing the profit.83  Therefore, the Commissioner initiated an investigation, which included 
observation by detectives and wiretapping of telephones.84   
The Deputy Administrator of the Environmental Protection Administration, which included 
the Department of Sanitation, called the Employees in for questioning.85  At the meeting, all the 
Employees were represented by counsel and advised by the Deputy Administrator of their “rights 
and privileges” under the laws of New York and the Constitution.86  When the Employees 
refused to answer any incriminating questions, the Commissioner suspended them.87  Eventually, 
the Commissioner gave the Employees a second opportunity to answer, but when the Employees 
subsequently refused, they were fired.88  The Employees then filed suit and demanded 
reinstatement on the ground that their Fifth Amendment rights and immunities had been 
violated.89  Both parties then filed motions for summary judgment, and the district court found 
for the Employees.90 
                                                 
82 Id.    
83 Id.   
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 621.   
86 Id.   
87 Id.   
88 Id. at 622.   
89 Id.   
90 Id. 
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On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and held that compelled 
testimony is constitutional so long as the questions posed by the government employer to public 
employees are about performance of their official duties and the employees are duly advised of 
their rights and immunities prior to questioning.91  The court reaffirmed the rule that if public 
employees are asked potentially incriminating questions and are not required to waive immunity, 
the privilege against self-incrimination is not a bar to his dismissal for refusal to answer.92  
However, the court also expressly included the requirement that public employers advise public 
employees of their rights and immunities, as well as the consequences of their decisions prior to 
asking potentially incriminating questions.93  Thus, the Second Circuit’s decision in Uniformed 
Sanitation Men stands for three propositions.  First, prior to asking potentially incriminating 
questions, government employers must advise public employees of their rights and immunities 
under the Fifth Amendment.94  Second, if employees who have been duly advised of their rights 
and immunities refuse to answer the government employer’s questions, the employer may 
constitutionally fire the employees.95  Third, if employees are duly advised of their rights and 
immunities and consent to answer the questions instead of face disciplinary action, those answers 
cannot be used against them in subsequent criminal proceedings.96   
Like the Second Circuit, the Seventh Circuit also adopts the “duty to advise” approach, 
which requires a government employer to give public employees notice of their rights and 
                                                 
91 Id. at 627.   
92 Id. 626.    
93 Id. at 627.   
94 Id.   
95 Id.   
96 Id.   
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immunities prior to asking potentially incriminating questions.  In Atwell v. Lisle Park Dist., 
Sarah Atwell brought an action in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against 
the Lisle Park District (the “Park District”) alleging that her Fifth Amendment rights were 
violated because the Park District terminated her for failure to cooperate with the investigation.97  
Due to a series of financial improprieties, the Park District initiated an investigation and 
suspended Atwell.98  In response, Atwell obtained counsel.99  However, prior to the questioning 
and in the course of an informal meeting, the investigator for the Park District informally 
instructed Atwell that her attorney would probably advise her to exercise her right to remain 
silent.100  As predicted, Atwell’s attorney advised her to refuse to consent to an interview and 
Atwell complied. The Park District then fired Atwell.101  Atwell sued, but the district court 
dismissed her case.102   
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit cited the Garrity rule that a government employer may 
compel a public employee to answer potentially incriminating questions upon penalty of job loss 
or disciplinary action only if that employee is not required to waive immunity.103  The court 
affirmed the district court’s decision to dismiss on the ground that the duty to advise never arose 
because Atwell never attended the interview.104  However, on the issue of notice, the court found 
                                                 
97 286 F.2d 987 (7th Cir. 2002).   
98 Id. at 989.   
99 Id.   
100 Id.   
101 Id.   
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 990.   
104 Id.   
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that a government employer who seeks to ask employees potentially incriminating questions 
must first warn the employees that because of the Garrity immunity, they may not refuse to 
answer the questions on the basis that the answers may be incriminating.105  The court reasoned 
that employees who are asked potentially incriminating questions may “instinctively ‘take the 
Fifth’” and unknowingly set themselves up to get fired without recourse.106  Ultimately, the 
Seventh Circuit maintained an express notice requirement, but emphasized that the rule was 
limited by the fact that “there can be no duty to warn until the employee is asked specific 
questions,” and that given this limitation the employee may not skip the interview altogether in 
an effort to avoid answering incriminating questions.107    
Like the Second and Seventh Circuits, the Federal Circuit also follows the rule that a 
government employer must warn its employees of their rights and immunities prior to asking 
potentially incriminating questions.  In Modrowski v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, the 
circumstances were somewhat different than the typical Fifth Amendment employment case.108  
There, the Department of Veterans Affairs (the “DVA”) employed Leon Modrowski as a Senior 
Realty Specialist in Chicago, Illinois.109  During that employment, the DVA began an internal 
investigation into the theft of property from houses owned by the DVA.110 In the course of this 
investigation, the DVA questioned Modrowski, and discovered that he had participated in two 
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unauthorized sales of property to his son-in-law, which was against DVA regulations.111  
Consequently, the DVA conducted a series of follow-up investigations on Modrowski, and in so 
doing sent him a letter that purported to grant him immunity, advised him of his Fifth 
Amendment rights, and compelled him to respond to questioning.112  However, Modrowski did 
not understand the scope of the purported immunity and thus continually refused to answer any 
questions during subsequent interrogations.113  Thereafter, Modrowski obtained counsel and 
continued to refuse to waive his right to silence.114  Ultimately, the DVA discharged Modrowski 
from federal service on the grounds that he violated conflict of interest rules, and more 
specifically failed to cooperate with the investigation.115  Accordingly, the Board affirmed the 
DVA’s decision to discharge Modrowski.116  As such, Modrowski appealed to the Federal 
Circuit.117  
On appeal, the Federal District reversed the Board’s decision regarding Modrowski’s 
refusal to submit to interrogation by the DVA.118  The court referred to the Garrity rule and held 
that the threat of discharge from public employment constitutes coercion, making any statements 
obtained as a result of such threat inadmissible against that employee in subsequent criminal 
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proceedings.119  Moreover, the court also held that a government employer may only properly 
invoke the right to compel answers to pertinent questions about the performance of the 
employee’s duties when the employee has been duly advised of the option to answer when 
actually granted immunity, or remain silent and face discharge.120  However, where the immunity 
granted by the public employer is not as comprehensive as the protection of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege, that employee is justified in refusing to answer potentially incriminating 
questions.121  Thus, the court decided that Modrowski was justified in refusing to answer the 
DVA’s questions because the scope of the purported grant of immunity was ambiguous, leaving 
open the possibility that any answers elicited during that questioning could be used against him 
in subsequent proceedings.122   
Therefore, the Second, Seventh, and Federal Circuits have all developed a “duty to advise” 
approach, which requires government employers to inform employees of their Fifth Amendment 
rights and immunities, as well as the consequences of their decisions prior to being asked 
potentially incriminating questions.  The Second Circuit held that public employees may only be 
discharged for failure to cooperate while under the cloak of immunity if they are duly advised of 
their rights and immunities prior to being asked specific pertinent questions about their duties of 
employment.123  In adopting this approach, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that because average 
employees are likely to exercise their Fifth Amendment right to remain silent they may 
unknowingly subject themselves to discharge without recourse if they are not first advised of 
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their rights and immunities under the Fifth Amendment.124  The Federal Circuit reinforced this 
concept and held that in order for notice to be constitutionally sufficient, the government 
employer must clearly advise employees of their rights and immunities in such a manner that the 
scope of immunity is broad enough to match the protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment.125   
IV. ANALYSIS 
As stated above, the Supreme Court decisions in Garrity and its progeny stand for the 
proposition that under the Fifth Amendment, public employees must be granted immunity from 
subsequent criminal prosecution if they are coerced into answering potentially incriminating 
questions.  However, the federal courts have split on the issue of whether a government 
employer must give employees notice of their rights and immunities under the Fifth Amendment 
prior to asking potentially incriminating questions.  The “no affirmative tender” approach of the 
Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits attempts to lessen the government’s burden and support the 
employer’s interest in reliable evidence by automatically attaching the right of immunity when 
an employee is compelled to answer incriminating questions.  The courts reason that such a 
notice requirement would be duplicative because the right to immunity attaches regardless of 
whether notice is given.  Thus, under this approach, if public employees are coerced into 
answering incriminating questions on threat of discipline or job loss, those answers cannot be 
used against them in subsequent proceedings.  Additionally, if public employees refuse to answer 
the questions without expressly being asked to waive their right to immunity, then the employer 
may discharge them for failure to cooperate.   
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However, this approach has two major problems.  First, by rejecting a notice requirement, 
the rule creates ambiguity with respect to employee actions.  For example, although the approach 
expressly permits employees to be fired for refusing to answer questions if they have not been 
asked to waive their immunity, it does not address the issue of whether discharge or discipline is 
appropriate where employees remain silent based on an “objectively reasonable fear” that their 
answers could be used against them in subsequent criminal proceedings.126  As such, it is entirely 
possible that public employees could be discharged or disciplined solely because they are 
unaware of their rights and the consequences of their decision to remain silent.127  In essence, 
without a notice requirement, public employees could unknowingly subject themselves to 
sanctions by exercising their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 
Second, this approach gives the government an extraordinary amount of room in which to 
take advantage of the employee.  Because the rule permits the government to fire employees for 
exercising their right to silence if they are not required to waive immunity, there is potential that 
the government could abuse its position as the more knowledgeable and powerful party.128  In 
essence, by not disclosing what the employee’s rights and obligations are under Garrity and the 
Fifth Amendment, the employer leaves the employee in a state of ambiguity that can easily be 
exploited.  As such, if it is not clear to public employees what their constitutional rights are, how 
their statements could be used against them, and how to respond to the often vague requests of 
employers to submit to questioning or polygraph interrogations, the employer could reasonably 
manipulate the situation so that the employees get fired or prosecuted, regardless of whether they 
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answer the questions or not.  This sort of imbalance in power should not be constitutionally 
permitted. 
In contrast, the “duty to advise” approach of the Second, Seventh, and Federal Circuits 
seeks to eliminate ambiguity and further the protections afforded in Garrity, by requiring 
government employers to fully disclose to employees their rights and immunities prior to 
subjecting them to potentially incriminating questioning.  This approach, which emphasizes the 
protective nature of Garrity, has four crucial advantages.   
First, by requiring employers to warn public employees that they may be fired for 
refusing to answer potentially incriminating questions if they have been granted immunity, the 
“duty to advise” approach eliminates the confusion created by the “no affirmative tender” 
approach.  Although lack of knowledge in the criminal arena is not a defense for committing a 
crime, the interplay between the Fifth Amendment and Garrity are such that average public 
employees may not fully understand their rights.  Even though it may be true that public 
employees are aware of their Fifth Amendment rights, it is more likely to be true that the same 
employees may not understand the various complex exceptions under Garrity, which is less 
widely known and understood than the Fifth Amendment.129  For example, because this approach 
expressly provides employees with the knowledge of all of their rights and immunities, there is 
no longer a risk that the employees will exercise their right to silence and unknowingly lose their 
job as a consequence of their decision.  Thus, the notice requirement permits employees to make 
informed decisions instead of encouraging them to make blind decisions. 
Second, this approach eliminates the potential for government employers to exploit the 
employee’s lack of familiarity with the Fifth Amendment rights and immunities.  By requiring 
                                                 
129 Id.   
25 
the employer to fully disclose all of the employee’s rights and immunities, as well as the 
consequences to those decisions, the “duty to advise” approach ensures that the employee is 
informed and less susceptible to any misrepresentation or deception by the government.  Such a 
requirement makes it more difficult for the government, which is in a position of power, to 
manipulate the situation into one where employees either get fired or prosecuted, irrespective of 
whether or not they submit to the questioning.130   In so doing, the disclosure requirement 
furthers the protective nature of Garrity by ensuring that the Fifth Amendment rights and 
immunities cannot be circumvented by government employers.   
Third, the “duty to advise” approach is favorable because the burden imposed on the 
government employer by the duty of disclosure would be rather low.131  In fact, the duty does not 
even arise until the interrogation takes place.  Essentially, the government’s duty to disclose 
never arises if the public employee fails to attend the questioning.  Furthermore, there is no 
indication that the notice requirement must be fact specific.  In fact, the Federal Circuit held that 
notice is sufficient even if the government uses a standardized form, as long as it is clear and 
fully conveys the public employee’s rights.132  Therefore, in comparison to the interest of 
fairness and clarity, the burden of giving notice to public employees prior to questioning is 
minimal.   
Fourth, the “duty to advise” approach is most favorable because it facilitates the 
government in its mission to obtain reliable information from public employees.  Whereas 
uninformed employees are likely to be untruthful or bend the facts in an attempt to avoid 
                                                 
130 Id.   
131 Id.   
132 Hanna v. Dep’t of Labor, 18 Fed. Appx. 787, 789-90 (Fed. Cir. 2001).   
26 
prosecution, employees who know from the beginning that they are immune from their 
statements in subsequent prosecution are more likely to give honest answers.  Although it is true 
that the statements may still be used against employees in regard to discipline or discharge by the 
employer, it is still much more likely that the employees will be honest if they know that those 
statements cannot be used against them in a subsequent criminal proceeding.  Therefore, the 
“duty to advise” approach is preferable because it reinforces the government’s interest in 
obtaining truthful information from its employees. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Everyday government employers are faced with the task of questioning public employees 
about potentially incriminating issues.  As a general rule, if the government employer seeks to 
compel employees to answer the questions on penalty of discipline or job loss, employees must 
also be provided with immunity from use of those statements against them in subsequent 
proceedings.  As such, a government employer cannot constitutionally fire employees for failure 
to waive their right to immunity.  However, although this rule is clear, it fails to specify whether 
the employer is under a duty to give public employees notice of these rights and immunities prior 
to interrogation.  
As to that question, the federal circuits are split as to whether there is a notice 
requirement.  The first group of circuits adopts the “no affirmative tender” approach, which 
rejects a notice requirement and automatically attaches immunity when public employees are 
compelled to waive their right to immunity and answer potentially incriminating questions on 
penalty of disciplinary action or job loss.  The second group of circuits adopts the “duty to 
advise” approach, which requires government employers to give employees notice of their rights 
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and immunities under the Fifth Amendment, as well as the consequences to any decisions they 
may make.   
This article argues that the “duty to advise” approach is the most favorable for four 
reasons.  First, it eliminates the potential for public employees to attempt to exercise their 
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and unknowingly subject themselves to 
discipline.  Second, it eliminates the potential that the government will use its position of power 
to manipulate or exploit the employee.  Third, the burden imposed on the government in 
comparison to the protection afforded to the employees would be inherently low.  Fourth, it 
facilitates the government in the process of fact-finding by giving the employees an incentive for 
honesty.  Therefore, the “duty to advise” approach should be adopted by all circuits. 
